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ARTICLE
JESSICA’S LAW RESIDENCY
RESTRICTIONS IN CALIFORNIA:
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
BRUCE ZUCKER *

INTRODUCTION
Sex offender residency restrictions in the United States became
ubiquitous throughout state and county jurisdictions in 2006 following
the passage of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (“SORA”). 1 Following
passage of SORA, over 30 states and hundreds of local counties and
municipalities adopted some form of restriction on where registered sex
offenders could live. 2 Although California had already placed some such
limits, California voters passed Proposition 83 in November 2006,
known as the Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s
Law (SPPCA). 3 Among other provisions, Jessica’s Law for the first time
prohibited certain registered sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet

*

Professor, College of Business and Economics, California State University Northridge.
Professor Zucker received his Juris Doctor from Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. He represents
offenders in post-conviction proceedings, including direct appeals, habeas corpus, and administrative
hearings.
1
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 14071 (2006)).
2
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5(a) (Providing that, if a sex offender was subject to
registration under Penal Code 290, meaning that he stood convicted of one or more certain
enumerated sex offenses, he could not live in a single family residence with another unrelated sex
offender).
3
2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 83 (Westlaw 2014); In re E.J., 47 Cal. 4th 1258, 1263 (2010).
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of “schools and parks where children regularly gather,” 4 divesting parole
authorities from making any exceptions or independent determinations
on case-by case bases.
This article explores the state of the law and current litigation
involving sex offender residency restrictions in California. It discusses
California’s Jessica’s Law, the enactment of Proposition 83, and the
Supreme Court’s ruling in In re E.J., 5 which gave some initial guidance
as to the validity and application of Jessica’s Law residency restrictions. 6
This article tracks litigation resulting from E.J. now pending in various
California courts. Finally, this article discusses the effectiveness of the
law on its intended purpose: whether children and communities are safer.
I.

PROPOSITION 83

In November 2006, approximately 70% of the California electorate
voted in favor of Proposition 83 (Jessica’s Law). 7 Then State Senator
George Runner (R-Antelope Valley) and his wife, State
Assemblywoman Sharon Runner (R-Antelope Valley), authored the
initiative. 8
Proposition 83 contained numerous provisions aimed at
strengthening California law on the prosecuting, sentencing,
imprisonment, and release of sex offenders. 9 Proposition 83 increased
the penalties for sex offenses; required GPS monitoring for sex
offenders, whether or not on parole or probation; strengthened the
Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) law, including more sex offenders into
the provision; and restricted where sex offenders may live in the
community. 10

4

2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 83, § 21 (Westlaw 2014) (amending CAL . PEN. CODE §
3003.5 to read “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for any person for whom
[sex offender] registration is required pursuant to Section 290 to reside within 2000 feet of any
public or private school, or park where children regularly gather.”).
5
In re E.J., 47 Cal. 4th 1258 (2010).
6
Id.
7
Proposition 83: Sex Offender Reform, CA SECRETARY OF STATE – GENERAL ELECTIONS
(Dec. 14, 2006 at 12:41 PM), http://vote2006.sos.ca.gov/Returns/prop/mapR083.htm.
8
Leon Worden, SCV Newsmaker of the Week: George Runner, State Senator and Honorary
Chairman,
Proposition
83,
SVCTV
(Oct.
29,
2006),
www.scvhistory.com/scvhistory/signal/newsmaker/sg102906-nm.htm
9
Proposition 83, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (Nov. 2006),
www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2006/83_11_2006.htm.
10
Id.
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With respect to residency restrictions, the relevant portion of
Proposition 83 changed the Penal Code by enacting section 3003.5(b) as
follows:
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for any
person for whom registration is required pursuant to Section 290 11 to
reside within 2000 feet of any public or private school, or park where
children regularly gather.
(c) Nothing in this section shall prohibit municipal jurisdictions from
enacting local ordinances that further restrict the residency of any
person for whom registration is required pursuant to Section 290. 12

The statute is not a model of clarity, primarily because any statute that is
enacted or amended by voter initiative and bypasses the legislative
vetting process is bound to encounter drafting, implementation, and
constitutional problems. 13 As a result, the law led to certain unintended
consequences, such as making sex offenders homeless and causing
authorities to lose track of them:
The restriction has resulted in more than 2,100 rapists, child molesters
and other sex offenders becoming transient in California since the law
was implemented three years ago - about one-third of the state’s total
paroled sex offenders, and a 24-fold increase since the law passed. In
dense cities such as San Francisco, where there is virtually no housing
that meets the restriction, more than 80 percent of paroled sex
offenders are homeless. 14

For these reasons, the court system has now been called upon to clarify
the mess created by this initiative.

11

CAL. PEN. CODE § 290(b) (requiring those convicted of certain enumerated sex related
criminal offenses to register for the rest of his or her life with the local police department both
annually and each time he or she changes residences). In some cases, courts may order offenders to
register pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 290 even if he or she did not commit one of the enumerated
offenses, if the court finds the offense to have been “sexually motivated.” Id. Willfully failing to
comply with the sex registration requirements can be criminally charged as a misdemeanor or
felony in California. CAL. PEN. CODE § 290.018.
12
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5.
13
See Michael Vitello, Punishing Sex Offenders: When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 651, 685-86 (Summer 2008 ); see also John Laird and Clyde Macdonald, More
Deliberation? Perspectives on the California Initiative Process and the Problems and Promise of its
Reform: A.B. 1245 of 2003 - An Attempt at Modest Reform of California’s Initiative Process, 47
CAL. W. L. REV. 301, 304 (Spring 2011).
14
Marisa Lagos, Residency Ban on Sex Offenders Targeted, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
December 27, 2010, at A1.
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AMBIGUITIES IN THE LAW

As a result of the implementation of section 3003.5(b), numerous
ambiguities in the language of the statute, as well as potential federal and
state constitutional violations, arose. For example, nothing in section
3003.5(b) states whether the law applies to all sex offenders required to
register under Penal Code section 290, or whether its reach is limited to
those convicted or paroled after the law became effective on November
6, 2006. 15 The law fails to specify whether people on probation
supervision for misdemeanors (or felonies) must comply, whether
violating the statute is a separate criminal offense, or whether the
government is limited to bringing a civil abatement action against the sex
offender violator. 16 If violation of section 3003.5(b) is a separate
criminal offense, the statute fails to state whether such an offense is an
infraction or a misdemeanor, and fails to state the potential penalties for
a violation one or more provisions of the statute 17 It essentially renders
the statute meaningless for purposes of criminal sanctions.
In addition to these issues, other questions have arisen as to the
meaning of various terms in the statute. These issues and questions are
explored below.
A.

MEANING OF THE TERM “RESIDE”

The first ambiguity that arose stemming from the application of
Section 3003.5(b) was the meaning and application of the word “reside.”
The statute prohibits those subject to the residency limitations from
residing within the 2,000 foot restricted area. “Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, it is unlawful for any person for whom registration is
required pursuant to Section 290 to reside within 2000 feet of any public
or private school, or park where children regularly gather.” 18 However,
the statute has failed to define what it means to “reside.”
The first law enforcement authority to interpret and enforce this
restriction, and to define the term “reside”, was the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Adult Parole
Operations (“CDCR”). On August 17, 2007, the CDCR issued and
implemented Policy No. 07-36, pertaining to the enforcement of
Jessica’s Law residency restrictions as to parolees under its

15

PENAL § 3003.5.
Id.
17
Id.
18
PENAL § 3003.5(b)
16
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jurisdiction. 19 Under this policy, any parolee released onto parole
supervision on or after November 8, 2006, who was required to register
as a sex offender under California Penal Code section 290 must either
have compliant housing or, otherwise, “declare themselves transient.” 20
Non-compliant parolees were arrested and charged with parole
violations. 21
The most interesting aspect of CDCR’s Policy Number 07-36 was
its definition of “reside” under the statute. Under the policy, a
“residence” is “one or more addresses at which a person regularly
resides, regardless of the number of days or nights spent there, such as a
shelter or structure that can be located by a street address, including, but
not limited to, houses, apartment buildings, motels, homeless shelters,
and recreational and other vehicles.” 22 In fact, CDCR previously
interpreted the residency term to include any parolee being physically
present in any building within the 2,000 foot restriction for more than a
two-hour period, unless the parolee was there for medical, work-related,
or business-related activities. 23 Even with this definition, CDCR’s
Policy fell short of defining the meaning of “regularly reside” in a
reasonable and constitutionally acceptable fashion.
B.

HOW THE 2,000 FOOT RESTRICTION IS MEASURED

The second ambiguity in the law arises with respect to the meaning
of “2,000 feet.” Nothing in the statute gives any indication as to how the
2,000 foot distance is measured. 24 For example, a parolee may live in an
urban area near a freeway and near a school or park. The school or park
may be located within a 2,000-foot radius of the parolee’s home by
drawing a straight line between the two locations, sometimes referred to

19

See In re E.J., 47 Cal. 4th at 1266.
Id. at 1267 fn. 3 (citing CDCR, Policy No. 07–48: Revised Procedures for Jessica’s Law
Notice to Comply (Oct. 11, 2007) (amending Policy No. 07–36)).
21
Parole Agents Begin Active Enforcement of 2,000 Foot Jessica’s Law Residency
Restrictions for Sex Offenders, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION
(Oct.
11,
2007),
www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/Press_Release_Archive/2007_Press_Releases/Press_Release_10-112007.html
22
CDCR, Policy No. 07–48: Revised Procedures for Jessica’s Law Notice to Comply (Oct.
11, 2007) (amending Policy No. 07–36)).
23
In re Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64, 74 fn. 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), review granted, In re
Taylor, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 566 (2013).
24
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5(b).
20
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by the idiom “as the crow flies.” 25 However, in order to get to the school
or park, the parolee would have to walk or drive around the freeway to
get there, which may equate to a distance of well-over 2,000 feet.
Instead of taking into account this reality, some authorities use the
“as the crow flies” method for determining the 2,000-foot distance. 26
This results in disqualifying numerous residences that, as a practical
matter, would be well over the 2,000 foot distance because a freeway or
other large obstruction stands between the two locations.
C.

MEANING OF THE TERM “SCHOOL”

Jessica’s Law prohibits registered sex offenders from residing
within 2,000 feet of a school. 27 However, it fails to define what is meant
by the term “school.” 28 As such, the law risks violating the First
Amendment as overbroad because it purports to cover any location that
includes the term “school” in the title. 29 Not only would a sex offender
be in violation if he/ she resided within 2,000 feet of a public elementary
school, but he/ she would also potentially be in violation if he/ she
resided within 2,000 feet of a university (primarily attended by adults) or
a trade school such as an H&R Block Tax Preparation school, a dental
assisting school, or a cooking school 30 . Moreover, an after-school
private tutoring businesses, such as Kumon, Kaplan, or Sylvan Learning

25

CAMBRIDGE ADVANCED LEARNERS DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 172 (3d ed. 2008)
(defining “as the crow flies” to be measured “as a straight line between the two places”).
26
See, e.g. John Sakata, Sex Offender Ordinance Tougher than State Law, LOMPOC RECORD
(Jul, 15, 2012 at 12.05 am), www.lompocrecord.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/sex-offenderordinance-tougher-than-state-law/article_8ca1d7f0-ce3e-11e1-a052-001a4bcf887a.html.
27
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5(b).
28
Id.
29
See, e.g. In re Sheena K., 40 Cal. 4th 875, 890 (2007) (holding a probation condition “
‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to
determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of
vagueness. A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must
closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as
unconstitutionally overbroad.” (citations omitted)).
30
The term “school” has a very real meaning. For example, Penal Code section 626,
subdivision (a)(4), defines “school” as “any public or private elementary school, junior high school,
four-year high school, senior high school, adult school or any branch thereof, opportunity school,
continuation high school, regional occupational center, evening high school, or technical school or
any public right-of-way situated immediately adjacent to school property or any other place if a
teacher and one or more pupils are required to be at that place in connection with assigned school
activities.” If this definition would be applied to define the term “school”, it would clearly be
constitutionally overbroad.
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Centers would appear to qualify as well. 31 The definition requires more
specificity to avoid such unintended interpretations and from
overreaching into constitutionally protected conduct.
D.

MEANING OF THE TERM “PARK WHERE CHILDREN REGULARLY
GATHER”

Another problem with Jessica’s Law residency restrictions is the
meaning of the term “park.” 32 Seemingly, Jessica’s Law targets parks
with playground equipment for children, such as slides, swings, and
jungle gyms. However, parks that lack such child play apparatuses
would not seem to be applicable, given their lack of appeal to children.
Moreover, locations that have the term “park” in the title but are
primarily intended for adults, such as baseball stadiums (i.e., Candlestick
Park) or hiking areas (i.e., Santa Monica Mountains National Park)
would likewise seem not to be intended for inclusion. It is therefore
unclear as to whether Jessica’s Law is intended to ban sex offenders
from living near recreational play areas where their primary activities do
not involve children.
Jessica’s Law prohibits those subject to it from living within 2,000
feet of a park “where children regularly gather.” 33 Again, the law fails to
define what was intended by this proscription. The term “children”
would presumably include more than one person who is under the age of
eighteen. This part seems clear enough. However, it is unclear what is
exactly meant by “regularly gather.” Would this apply if more than one
child “gathers” on a daily basis? What if a particular park is devoid of
children, except on weekends? Is that regular enough to satisfy the
parameters of the statute? Who measures and determines the minimum
requirements for qualifying as a park where “children regularly gather.”
How does a sex offender receive notice?

31

Of particular concern is the ease with which these businesses can establish themselves and
their relative transiency. For example, Kumon, the country’s largest after-school tutoring franchise,
licenses over 2,000 locations in the United States. Each are run as small businesses and are located
in all different neighborhoods and communities. Because Kumon is growing, there is no telling
when or where the next Kumon location will appear. This would potentially displace all existing
sex-offender registrants within a 2,000 foot radius. See Own a Franchise – Kumon North America,
KUMON, www.kumonfranchise.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
32
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5(b) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is
unlawful for any person for whom registration is required pursuant to Section 290 to reside within
2000 feet of any public or private school, or park where children regularly gather.” ) (emphasis
added).
33
Id.
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Some communities have actually gone as far as creating areas called
“pocket parks” in order to force sex offenders out of their
neighborhoods. 34 They are being built across the country. 35 For
example, the City of Los Angeles has plans underway to construct at
least three “pocket parks.” These locations will consist of small swaths
of land less than one-fifth of an acre in size (about the size of a small
backyard to a single family residence) intended to uproot and displace
sex offenders currently residing nearby. 36 Although very clever and
effective, if every community is allowed to build these relatively
inexpensive play areas solely for the purpose of banning sex offenders
from their neighborhoods, there will be nowhere left for sex offenders to
live. Although many people may be happy with such an outcome, the
effect will be to drive sex offenders into homelessness, living out of cars
vans in the very same neighborhoods trying to ban them. 37 They would
still be physically present in these communities. However, they would
not have official addresses and, therefore, would not have to register the
locations of their living quarters with local police. This would,
ironically, lead to even worse outcomes. 38
E.

LACK OF CLARIFYING AUTHORITY

To date, Jessica’s Law is over seven years old. 39 Nevertheless,
these ambiguities continue to puzzle and perplex law enforcement, the
courts, sex offenders, and the community. In particular, the lack of
guidance, the lack of consistency in enforcement methodology across the
34

Ian Lovett, Neighborhoods Seek to Banish Sex Offenders by Building Parks, N.Y. TIMES,
March 9, 2013, at A22 (“From the metropolis of Miami to the small town of Sapulpa, Okla.,
communities are building pocket parks, sometimes so small that they have barely enough room for a
swing set, to drive out sex offenders. One playground installation company in Houston has even
advertised its services to homeowners associations as an option for keeping sex offenders away.”).
35
Id.
36
Angel Jennings, L.A. Sees Parks as a Weapon Against Sex Offenders, L.A. TIMES, March 1,
2013, at A1. (quoting Los Angeles City Councilman Joe Buscaino as stating, “I want to do
everything in my power to keep child sex offenders away from children. We have to look at some
solutions and in comes the pocket park idea.”) It remains to be seen as to whether this truly
comports with the intent of Jessica’s Law.
37
See Ian Lovett, Neighborhoods Seek to Banish Sex Offenders by Building Parks, N.Y.
TIMES, March 9, 2013, at A22 (quoting a landlord as saying “[p]eople come out of jail, and they
just become homeless . . . [t]hey have no food, no money, no anything. What’s the possibility then
that they’re going to reoffend? They can add all the parks they want, but they still have to go
somewhere.”).
38
Id.
39
Jessica’s Law was passed by California voters on November 7, 2006. Proposition 83: Sex
Offender Reform, CA SECRETARY OF STATE – GENERAL ELECTIONS (Dec. 14, 2006 at 12:41 PM),
http://vote2006.sos.ca.gov/Returns/prop/mapR083.htm.
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state, and the sweeping nature of the residency restrictions leave a
tremendous void for those trying to understand how it must be
implemented. 40
III. LACK OF AVAILABLE HOUSING IN URBAN AREAS
One of the primary contentions that sex offenders have advanced in
opposition to Jessica’s Law concerns the utter lack of availability of
compliant housing in urban locations in California; particularly, San
Francisco, the greater Los Angeles area, San Jose, and San Diego.
In November 2010, Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Peter
Espinoza issued a ruling which stated that Jessica’s Law left sex
offenders with the Hobson’s choice of either violating parole and
returning to prison on the one hand, or choosing to be homeless on the
other hand 41 . This is the practical result because so much of the greater
Los Angeles area lacks affordable residential housing compliant with the
law. In his ruling, Judge Espinoza stated that the Los Angeles County
Superior Court received over 650 petitions from sex offenders made
homeless by Jessica’s Law, and that the numbers were ever increasing. 42
The ruling cited a statement made by Los Angeles Chief of Police
Charlie Beck that the Law caused “a marked increase of
homeless/transient [sex offender] registrants.” 43 Judge Espinoza further
opined:
Rather than protecting public safety, it appears that the sharp rise in
homelessness rates in sex offenders on active parole in Los Angeles
County actually undermines public safety . . . The evidence presented
suggests that despite lay belief, a sex offender parolee’s residential
proximity to a school or park where children regularly gather does not
bear on the parolee’s likelihood to commit a sexual offense against a
child. 44

40

John Simerman,, Report: State Board Says Sex-Offender Law Needs To Be Refined, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 21, 2008), www.mercurynews.com/nationworld/ci_8325634 (“[A]
wide-ranging report, the first from the newly formed California Sex Offender Management Board,
paints a picture of a state trying to catch up to some of the nation’s toughest anti-predator laws,
while legal questions remain and funding for research, local enforcement and treatment goes
lacking.”).
41
See, supra, footnotes 44 and 45.
42
Andrew Blankstein, Law Restricting Where Sex Offenders Can Live is Unconstitutional,
L.A. TIMES, November 4, 2010, at A1.
43
Id.
44
Id.
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The problem is not just limited to Los Angeles. Other cities, such
as San Francisco and San Diego, are so densely populated that the
availability of compliant housing is virtually non-existent. Sex offenders
in the San Francisco area have found difficulty finding affordable,
compliant housing as well. “Nearly all of San Francisco. . .is off-limits
to sex offenders because of the number of parks and schools close to
housing.” 45
A study prepared for the In re Taylor 46 litigation, concluded that
virtually no compliant affordable housing exists in the San Diego area
for sex offenders. Julie Wartell, a crime analyst who worked for the San
Diego County District Attorney’s Office in 2010, conducted a study of
the impact Jessica’s Law would have on San Diego County’s available
housing for sex offenders. 47
Although Wartell’s study showed
approximately one-fourth of San Diego County residences compliant
Jessica’s Law, less than three percent of San Diego County’s multifamily
parcels were compliant. 48 When considering the fact that only five to
eight percent of those residential units were available for rent at any
particular time, this left sex offenders with almost no available housing
compliant with Jessica’s Law. 49
Thomas Green, a National University professor who also
participated in the study, noted how hard it was, as a practical matter,
finding compliant housing: “Besides making phone calls, besides driving
all over the county to only find two, made—it seems to me like it would
be a very difficult proposition to try to find affordable housing that was
compliant.” 50
IV. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT’S INVOLVEMENT
A.

IN RE E.J. ON HABEAS CORPUS: THE INITIAL SUPREME COURT
RULING

Almost as soon as Jessica’s Law became operative, the California
Supreme Court heard a challenge to Jessica’s Law in the case of In re
E.J. on Habeas Corpus, 51 a consolidated habeas corpus lawsuit where
45

Id.
209 Cal. App. 4th 210 (2012).
47
Id. at 219-220.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 221.
51
In re E.J. on Habeas Corpus, 47 Cal. 4th 1258 (2010).
46
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four California parolees contested its constitutionality. 52 They sought to
stop state parole authorities from enforcing the residency restrictions of
Jessica’s Law against them because (1) doing so violated the ex post
facto clauses of the United States and California Constitutions; 53 (2) it
violated their state and federal constitutional rights to privacy,
substantive due process, and intrastate travel; and (3) it infringed on their
right to be free of being subject to a vague and overbroad statutory
scheme which could result in loss of liberty. 54
On February 1, 2010, the Court rejected the petitioners’ challenge as
to the retroactivity and ex post facto application of the statute to them.
“[Jessica’s Law] is not an ex post facto law if applied to such conduct
occurring after its effective date because it does not additionally punish
for the sex offense conviction or convictions that originally gave rise to
the parolee’s status as a lifetime registrant under section 290.” 55
However, the Court found that their “as applied” challenge, i.e., that
the Jessica’s Law residency restrictions infringes on their right to
substantive due process rights, right to privacy, property rights and right
to intrastate travel, could not be resolved based on the record presented 56 .
Rather, the Court held that “[t]he trial courts of the counties to which
petitioners have been paroled are manifestly in the best position to
conduct such hearings and find the relevant facts necessary to decide the
claims with regard to each such jurisdiction.” 57 As such, sex offenders in
various counties began litigating some of these issues. Currently, the
Taylor 58 case is making its way through the court system on the
residency restriction issue. 59
B.

PEOPLE V. MOSLEY: APPLICABILITY LIMITED TO CALIFORNIA
PAROLEES

Another issue raised by both government and defense lawyers is
whether Jessica’s Law residency restrictions is limited to people on
active parole supervision, or whether it applies on a broader scale to all
convicted sex offenders subject to Penal Code 290 registration

52

Id. at 1263.
See U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 10; see also CAL. CONST. ART. I, § 9.
54
In re E.J., 47 Cal. 4th at 1263.
55
Id. at 1280.
56
Id. at 1283-1284.
57
Id. at 1283.
58
In re Taylor, 209 Cal. App. 4th 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010), review granted and opinion
superseded (Jan. 3, 2013).
59
See Section II.C, infra.
53
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requirements. People v. Mosley, a case currently pending in the
California Supreme Court, is grappling with that very issue. 60
California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris has taken the
position in the Mosley case that Jessica’s Law residency restrictions
applies only to parolees. In her opening brief on the merits, the Attorney
General made the following argument:
Jessica’s Law imposes its residency restriction only on parolees and
only as a statutory condition of their parole from prison. As merely a
misdemeanor probationer, rather than a felony parolee, Mosley is not
subject to the Jessica’s Law residency restriction at all. . .Although
one could make a plausible argument that the Jessica’s Law residency
restriction applies to all sex offender registrants and that violation of
the restriction is a crime, which might have been the intent of the
voters in passing Proposition 83, the better view. . .is that the
residency restriction operates only as a condition of parole.
Accordingly. . .Mosley’s misdemeanor conviction and resultant
obligation to register as a sex offender do not subject him to the
61
Jessica’s Law residency restriction [because he is not a parolee.]

Furthermore, according to the California Attorney General, Jessica’s
Law is not a crime: it only applies if it is imposed as a condition of
parole. 62 In the same brief discussed above, the Attorney General made
that argument:
In the previous E.J. cases, this Court did not decide whether section
3003.5(b) governed only parolees or created a separate new
misdemeanor offense applicable to all sex offenders subject to
registration regardless of their parole status because the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation in that case was seeking only to
enforce section 3003.5(b) as a statutory parole condition; and, as this
Court further noted, there was no indication that any other registered

60

The Mosley case actually focuses on the primary issue of whether the discretionary
imposition of lifetime sex offender registration, which includes residency restrictions that prohibit
registered sex offenders from living “within 2000 feet of any public or private school, or park where
children regularly gather” PENAL CODE § 3003.5, subd. (b)), increase the “penalty” for the offense
within the meaning of Apprendi v. New Jersey 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and require that the facts
supporting the trial court’s imposition of the registration requirement be found true by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt. People v. Mosley, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d . 321, 322 -323, review granted, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 280 (2011). However, collateral to that is whether Jessica’s Law even applies to non-parolees
in the first instance. Id.
61
See Mosley, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 280, Respondent Attorney General’s Opening Brief on
the Merits, at pages 11-12. Attorney General Kamala Harris is the chief law enforcement officer in
California, and is principally charged with enforcing Jessica’s Law.
62
Id.
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sex offenders, on parole or otherwise, had ever been charged with a
criminal offense based on this provision. [citations] Now, however,
this Court has requested briefing on the question left unanswered in
E.J.
As explained below, it may reasonably be argued that the electorate, in
voting for Proposition 83, intended that the residency restriction would
govern all sex offenders subjected to a lifetime registration obligation
and that violation of its terms would constitute a misdemeanor.
Nevertheless, the Attorney General, on behalf of the People, has
consistently taken the position, in state and federal courts, that section
3003.5(b) did not successfully carry out any such alleged intent.
Instead, the better reading of section 3003.5(b) is that it applies only to
parolees as a statutory condition of parole and that its sanction extends
only to holding the parolee in violation of parole rather than to holding
him culpable for a new crime. Although the matter is not free from
doubt, respondent adheres to that position here.
The drafters of Proposition 83, and the voters who approved it, may
have intended that the section 3003.5(b) residency restriction would
govern all sex offender registrants. But the more reasonable view is
63
that section 3003.5(b) as adopted applies only to parolees.

The Mosley case remains on the Supreme Court docket. It is fully
briefed and is currently awaiting calendaring for oral argument. 64
C.

IN RE TAYLOR: THE CASE THAT WILL LIKELY RESOLVE THE
RESIDENCY RESTRICTION ISSUE

The case of In re Taylor 65 will probably settle once and for all the
issue of whether residency restrictions violate state and federal
constitutional protections of sex offenders. After the passage of
Proposition 83, numerous sex offenders filed petitions for writs of habeas
corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court directly challenging the
constitutionality of the residency restrictions. 66
Specifically, the
petitioners challenged the “as applied” aspect of the restriction pursuant
to the directive that the California Supreme Court gave in the E.J. cases
discussed supra. 67

63

Id. at pages 15 through 16.
People v. Mosley, Cal. Supreme Court Case No. S187965.
65
147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
66
Id. at 68-71.
67
Id. at 66-67.
64
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After an eight-day evidentiary hearing, the superior court ruled the
residency restriction “unconstitutionally unreasonable as applied to the
lead petitioners because it violated [their] right to intrastate travel, their
right to establish a home and their right to privacy and was not narrowly
drawn and specifically tailored to the individual circumstances of each
sex offender parolee.” 68 The court further opined “the fundamental vice
of section 3003.5(b) as a parole condition . . . [is i]t is not narrowly
drawn, much less specifically tailored to the individual. It applies as a
blanket proscription, blindly applied to all registered sex offenders on
parole without consideration of the circumstances or history of the
individual case.” 69 As applied, nothing in the residency restriction
furthers the intent of the law by creating “predator free zones around
schools and parks where children gather,” when balanced against the
broad effect of the statute curtailing or eliminating the availability of
housing for most sex offenders. 70 The law essentially resulted in a
complete banishment of sex offenders from residing in the county, “in
essence, banishing them from living within most if not all of the
county.” 71 Finally, the trial court ruled that treating all sex offenders
identically “regardless of whether his or her crime involved the
victimization of children or adults” undermines the very underpinning of
the residency restriction in the first instance. 72 The State appealed the
decision and the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court’s ruling. 73
The State of California filed a petition for review in the California
Supreme Court 74 . On January 3, 2013, the Supreme Court granted
review on the following issue: Does the residency restriction of Penal
Code section 3003.5, subdivision (b), when enforced as a mandatory
parole condition against registered sex offenders paroled to San Diego
County, constitute an unreasonable statutory parole condition that
infringes on their constitutional rights? 75 The case is currently under
review and a decision is expected sometime within the next two years.
It is hard to predict how the Supreme Court will rule in the Taylor
case. 76 On the one hand, the Court could have already taken the position
68

Id. at 67.
Id.
70
Id. at 83
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
209 Cal. App. 4th 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
69
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that sex offenders have no constitutional right to reasonable limitations
on residency restrictions in In re E.J. 77 In fact, the Court of Appeal laid
out a carefully considered and methodically reasoned decision in the
Taylor case, laying the foundation for the Supreme Court to follow it.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court were inclined to merely
adopt the Taylor court’s position, it could have denied review at the
outset. The Supreme Court is currently composed of fairly conservative
justices, 78 who, as a group, are unlikely to go to any great lengths to
provide relief to sex offenders, and otherwise politically unpopular and
disenfranchised group of people.
CONCLUSION
California voters passed Jessica’s Law, along with its residency
restrictions, over six years ago, presumably with the intention to make
their neighborhoods safer for children by restricting where sex offenders
may live. However, the poor and sloppy drafting of this initiative has
left law enforcement, the courts, and the community in disarray over its
proper application and enforcement.
Sentencing courts and state parole authorities already have the legal
authority to impose reasonable residency restrictions on sex offenders. 79
However, this authority has been displaced by the enactment of these
residency restrictions. A better solution would be to eliminate Jessica’s
Law residency restrictions and to reinvest the courts and parole
authorities with the power to customize such restrictions on a case-bycase basis.

77

In re E.J., (2010) 47 Cal. 4th at 1258
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil
Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 53 (Fall 2002)
(explaining that beginning in 1983, with the election of Republican governor George Deukmejian,
the California Supreme Court’s judicial philosophy has evolved to be more conservative nature). As
of Fall 2013, all but one of the seven sitting California Supreme Court justices were appointed by
Republican governors. Justices –Supreme Court, CALIFORNIA COURTS – THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF
CALIFORNIA, WWW.courts.ca.gov/3014.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
79
See People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 486 (1975). (empowering trial courts with the ability
to set probation conditions for individuals sentenced to a term of probation. The conditions are
presumtively valid unless they (1) have no relationship to the crime of which the offender was
convicted, (2) relate to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) require or forbid conduct
which is not reasonably related to future criminality.); see also: Cal. PEN. CODE § 3000(b)(7).
(empowering the Department of Corrections with the ability to set conditions of parole for those
individuals sentenced to state prison.).
78
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